The arrangement is a compromise that safeguards the legitimate autonomy patients and preserves the integrity of physicians, but it has been continually attacked by activists who want to compel objecting physicians to provide or facilitate abortion and contraception, and, lately, euthanasia. Essentially, the activists assert that physicians have a duty to do what they believe to be wrong because they must not act upon their moral or religious beliefs.
However, it is incoherent to include a duty to do what one believes to be wrong in a code of ethics, the very purpose of which is to encourage physicians to act ethically and avoid wrongdoing. Moreover, one cannot practise medicine without reference to beliefs, whether they reflect a secular ethic or a religious one, and neither a secular ethic nor a religious ethic is morally neutral. Thus, demands that physicians must not act upon their beliefs or must practise medicine in a morally "neutral" fashion are unacceptable because they are impossible.
The demand that physicians must not act upon religious beliefs because medical practice is a secular profession is unacceptable because it is erroneous. The Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged that a secular society is not faith-free; it includes both religious and non-religious believers, and rational democratic pluralism must make room them all. The full bench Protection of Conscience Project www.consciencelaws.org of the Court has warned that to disadvantage or disqualify the exercise of religiously informed conscience in public affairs is an illiberal distortion of liberal principles.
If it is legitimate to compel religious believers to do what they believe to be wrong, then it is equally legitimate to compel non-religious believers to do what they think is wrong; everyone would have a duty to do what is believed to be wrong. Hence, the compromise worked out by the Canadian Medical Association not only safeguards the integrity of physicians and legitimate autonomy of patients, but protects the community against the temptation to give credence to a dangerous idea: that a learned or privileged class, a profession or state institutions can legitimately compel people to participate in what they believe to be wrong -even gravely wrong -even murder -and punish them if they refuse.
Freedom of conscience and freedom of religion are not unlimited, but the mantra, "the freedom to hold beliefs is broader than the freedom to act on them" is inadequate. More refined distinctions are required to address the difficulties that arise in a pluralist democracy. One of them reflects the two ways in which freedom of conscience is exercised: by pursuing good and avoiding evil. There is a significant difference between preventing people from seeking perfection by doing the good that they wish to do and destroying their integrity by forcing them to do the evil that they abhor.
As a general rule, it is fundamentally unjust and offensive to force people to support, facilitate or participate in what they perceive to be wrongful acts; the more serious the wrongdoing, the graver the injustice and offence. It is a policy fundamentally opposed to civic friendship, which grounds and sustains political community and provides the strongest motive for justice. It is inconsistent with the best traditions and aspirations of liberal democracy. And it is dangerous, since it instills attitudes more suited to totalitarian regimes than to the demands of responsible freedom.
This does not mean that freedom of conscience exercised to preserve personal integrity can never be limited. It does mean, however, that even the strict approach taken to limiting other fundamental rights and freedoms is not sufficiently refined to be safely applied here. Like the use of potentially deadly force, if the restriction of preservative freedom of conscience can be justified at all, it will only be as a last resort and only in the most exceptional circumstances.
When the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario receives complaints from patients who have been unable to obtain services they want, the College should help connect the patients with willing service providers. That would be more helpful than attempting to suppress freedom of conscience and religion in the medical profession. drew specific attention to concerns raised among respondents to a purported obligation to assist patients in obtaining morally controversial services. Thus, the CPSO President 11 effectively confirmed that the focus of the proposed policy reflected the long-standing activist determination to force physicians to facilitate contraception, abortion and related procedures, even at the cost of violating their religious or moral convictions.
I.4.05
As a result of the controversy, the College delayed consideration of Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights Code and made some revisions to it. However, it kept the revisions secret until the day the document was considered by the College Council, thus preventing comment on it by the public and medical professionals prior to its approval.
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The revisions deleted the most objectionable language in the policy, which has been in effect since that time.
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I.4.06
The OHRC does not appear to have retreated from its position of marked hostility to freedom of conscience in the medical profession, as its submissions remain on its website without comment or qualification and continue to influence public opinion, as we shall see presently (I.7.07). incompetent, "unethical and unprofessional," a "worthless piece of ____," a "crummy 32 33 34 doctor," "an idiot," and judged him to be -judgemental. 
III. Context
III.1 A response to the issue requires the application of principles, the significance of which is affected by the social context within which the policy is to operate.
III.2
Two factors contribute significantly to the social context that must be considered if Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights Code is to be revised: anti-religious secularism and the connection between the "reproductive rights" agenda and euthanasia/assisted suicide.
III.3 Anti-religious secularism
III.3.01 What generated the most frequent and heated anathemas in the crusade against the Ottawa physicians was that they were motivated, in part, by "religious values." The crusaders' opinions and beliefs seem to have been shaped from infancy by secularism. Thus, they 52 were infuriated by a refusal based on religious beliefs. That was heresy against the faith in which they had been raised, the response to which was obvious to them; extirpate the heretics: "NO MORE CHRISTIAN DOCTORS" 53 III.3.02 That explains why their response was not unlike the witch-hunt whipped up in Montreal after two daycare workers were seen wearing niqabs in a public place on an outing with Ottawa area physicians do not prescribe or refer for contraceptives or abortion (both widely available without referral), or that a young woman had to drive around the block to get birth control pills.
III.3.03
It is important that the College should not inadvertently inflame anti-religious sentiments and bigotry or contribute to a climate of intolerance by ill-advised revisions to Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights Code. It should, instead, encourage a rational pluralism respectful of our fundamental freedoms that adequately accommodates the practical living out of divergent non-religious and religious beliefs. Thus, the plan for careful and extended consultation is welcome.
III.4 From abortion and contraception to euthanasia

III.4.01
The arguments now said to justify compelling objecting physicians to provide or refer for abortion and contraception are the same arguments put forward to compel objecting physicians to provide or facilitate euthanasia and assisted suicide. As illustrated by developments in Quebec, compulsion in the former case will inevitably lead to compulsion in the latter.
III.4.02 When laws governing abortion and contraception became less restrictive almost fifty years ago, the kind of attacks now being made on physicians and other health care workers who decline to provide or facilitate the services was beyond imagining. No one would then have anticipated that the more liberal society they thought they were building would generate the vituperative intolerance now evident in Ontario.
III.4.03 However, if current atmosphere and trends persist, it is not now beyond imagining that a columnist will eventually proclaim that physicians who are "so antediluvian as to be antieuthanasia" had better find another job. That is not the approach to rational pluralism or medical ethics one would hope to find in a liberal democracy, and Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights Code should avoid encouraging attitudes that may contribute to such an outcome.
IV. Scope and sequence of this submission
IV.1 Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights Code (POHRC) is divided into two sections.
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The first concerns the obligation of physicians to avoid unjust discrimination. The second concerns the obligation of physicians to accommodate people with disabilities who are or who wish to become patients. Only the first section is relevant here.
IV.2
The first part of the document is further subdivided into discussion of clinical competence and discussion of moral or religious beliefs. This submission concerns the discussion of physician freedom of conscience and religion included in the latter subdivision, which concludes with four expectations of physicians who act on moral or religious beliefs in their practices.
IV.3
The guidance concerning moral or religious beliefs is presumably the basis for the four College expectations and will be addressed in this submission. It is important, because the 7 document states that "the extent to which a physician has complied with this guidance" will be considered by the College "when evaluating whether the physician's behaviour constitutes professional misconduct." 56 IV. 4 The Project submission concerning POHRC reflects seven principles that ought to inform a policy on freedom of conscience in health care. They are not exhaustive, but are relevant to POHRC because of its history and the current social context. The principles will be stated and briefly explained before being applied in an analysis of the document. The submission will conclude by summarizing recommendations based upon the principles and the critique of the policy.
IV.5
The Project's 2008 submission concerning POHRC addressed a number of other issues that will not be reviewed here, such as the needs of the patient or obligations allegedly implied by social contract theory or fiduciary duty. The submission can be consulted online.
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V. Principles
Medicine is a moral enterprise.
V.1.01 The practice of medicine is an inescapably moral enterprise precisely because physicians are always seeking to do some kind of good and avoid some kind of evil for their patients. However, the moral aspect of practice as it relates to the conduct and moral 58 responsibility of a physician is usually implicit, not explicit. It is normally eclipsed by the needs of the patient and exigencies of practice. But it is never absent; every decision concerning treatment is a moral decision, whether or not the physician specifically adverts to that fact.
V.1.02 This point is frequently overlooked when a physician, for reasons of conscience, declines to participate in or provide a service or procedure that is routinely provided by his colleagues. They may be disturbed because they assume that, in making a moral decision about treatment, he has done something unusual, even improper. Seeing nothing wrong with the procedure, they see no moral judgement involved in providing it. In their view, the objector has brought morality into a situation where it doesn't belong, and, worse, it is his morality.
V.1.03 In point of fact, the moral issue was there all along, but they didn't notice it because they have been unreflectively doing what they were taught to do in medical school and residency, and what society expects them to do. Nonetheless, in deciding to provide the procedure they also implicitly concede its goodness; they would not provide it if they did not think it was a good thing to do. What unsettles them is really not that the objector has taken a moral position on the issue, but that he has made an explicit moral judgement that differs from their implicit one.
V.1.04 Hence, the demand that physicians must not be allowed to act upon beliefs is unacceptable because it is impossible; one cannot act morally without reference to beliefs, and cannot practise medicine without reference to beliefs. Relevant here is a comment by Professor being" of a patient is largely determined by a competent patient, not by a physician, though a physician may well contribute to the patient's decision. However, it does not follow that a physician is always obliged to agree with the patient's decision or to give effect to it. What happens in the case of such disagreements is largely dependent upon patient and physician concerned and their respective evaluations of what is at stake. More relevant here is the obligation of the physician to offer the patient his best medical judgement about a recommended course of treatment or action, and, in so doing, select treatments that avoid or minimize health risks or adverse side effects.
V.2.02 Sound medical judgement begins with and remains focussed on the patient and is exercised respectfully. It must be informed by correct science, avoiding or minimizing foreseeable risks or harm. It must seek a reasonably effective response to the needs of the patient, the anticipated benefits of which outweigh potential risks or harms. Medical judgement requires the reasonable exercise of discretion, which is shaped and refined by clinical wisdom born of experience. More could be added, but these elements are essential.
V.2.03 Physicians are expected to provide patients with accurate information about all legal options available to them, the effectiveness of the methods, adverse effects or risks associated with each, benefits associated with each, and other information that someone in the position of a patient would reasonably want to know. In some cases the physician might have to provide a great deal of information; in others, it may simply be a matter of filling in some gaps in what the patient knows. In all cases, the physician must take care 61 to present the information in a form comprehensible to the patient. 62 V.2.04 The physician must disclose whether or not he has religious, ethical or other conscientious convictions that generally preclude him from providing some services or treatments, even if medical judgement is central to his practice. The reason for this is that the patient is 63 entitled to be apprised of non-medical factors that may influence a physician's medical judgement and recommendations. The patient is also entitled to know whether or not the physician's medical evaluation of the treatment in question is consistent with the general view of the medical profession. 64 V.2.05 The physician should invite questions from the patient at different stages in the consultation to ensure that he has been correctly understood. The goal is to ensure that 65 the patient has sufficient information and understanding to make an informed decision about what kind of treatment she will accept. With respect to any reference to his conscientious convictions, unless the patient questions him, asks for further explanation, or otherwise indicates that she does not understand his position, the physician need not and probably should not expand upon the basis for his own position. To do so would likely 9 invite the accusation that he is "preaching."
Morality is a human enterprise.
V.3.01 All public behaviour -how one treats other people, how one treats animals, how one treats the environment -is determined by what one believes. All beliefs influence public behaviour. Some of these beliefs are religious, some not, but all are beliefs. This applies no less to "secular" ethics than to religious ethics. A secular ethic may be independent of religion, but it is not faith-free, nor is it beyond the influence of faith. On the contrary: a 67 secular ethic, like any ethic, is faith-based. That human dignity exists -or that it does notor that human life is worthy of unconditional reverence -or merely conditional respectand notions of beneficence, justice and equality are not the product of scientific enquiry, but rest upon faith: upon beliefs about human nature, the meaning and purpose of life, the existence of good and evil.
V.3.02 That everyone is a believer reflects the fact that the practice of morality is a human enterprise, but it is not a scientific enterprise. The classic ethical question, "How ought I 68 to live?" is not a scientific question and cannot be answered by any of the disciplines of natural science, though natural science can provide raw material needed for adequate answers.
V.3.03 Answers to the question, "How ought I to live?" reflect two fundamental moral norms; do good, avoid evil. These basics have traditionally been undisputed; the disputes begin with identifying or defining good and evil and what constitutes "doing" and "avoiding." Such explorations are the province of philosophy, ethics, theology and religion. Internationally, religion continues to be the principal means by which concepts of good and evil and right and wrong conduct are sustained and transmitted.
V.3.04 Nonetheless, since the practice of morality is a human enterprise, reflections about morality and the development and transmission of ideas about right and wrong also occurs within culture and society outside the framework of identifiable academic disciplines and religions. In consequence, the secular public square is populated by people with any number of moral viewpoints, some religious, some not: some tied to particular philosophical or ethical systems, some not: but all of them believers. There is no reason to deny the freedom to act upon religious belief because it is religious: no reason, that is, apart from anti-religious bigotry.
V.4 A secular public square includes religious belief
V4.01
It is for this reason that the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that, in Canadian law, "secular" must be understood to include religious belief. In his paper, Seeing Through the Secular Illusion, Dr. Iain Benson emphasizes this by referring to an 69 explanation supported by the full bench of the Court:
In my view, Saunders J. below erred in her assumption that 'secular' effectively meant 'non-religious'. This is incorrect since nothing in the Charter, political or democratic theory, or a proper understanding of pluralism demands that atheistically based moral positions trump 10 religiously based moral positions on matters of public policy. I note that the preamble to the Charter itself establishes that '... Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law'. According to the reasoning espoused by Saunders J., if one's moral view manifests from a religiously grounded faith, it is not to be heard in the public square, but if it does not, then it is publicly acceptable. The problem with this approach is that everyone has 'belief' or 'faith' in something, be it atheistic, agnostic or religious. To construe the 'secular' as the realm of the 'unbelief' is therefore erroneous. Given this, why, then, should the religiously informed conscience be placed at a public disadvantage or disqualification? To do so would be to distort liberal principles in an illiberal fashion and would provide only a feeble notion of pluralism. The key is that people will disagree about important issues, and such disagreement, where it does not imperil community living, must be capable of being accommodated at the core of a modern pluralism. 81 82 is wrong might be pushed. In Quebec, it is now being pushed as far as requiring physicians to participate in killing patients, even if they believe it is wrong: even if they believe that it is first degree murder. 83 V.6.05 The difficult compromise described in I.2 safeguards the legitimate autonomy of the patient and preserves the integrity of the physician, but it also protects the community against the temptation to give credence to a dangerous idea: that a learned or privileged class, a profession or state institutions can legitimately compel people to do what they believe to be wrong -even gravely wrong -and punish them if they refuse. Canada intended its comment to be put to such use in a liberal democracy.
V.7.03 The mantra, "the freedom to hold beliefs is broader than the freedom to act on them" is not wrong, but it is inadequate. It is simply not responsive to many of the questions about the exercise of freedom of conscience that arise in a society characterized by a plurality of moral and political viewpoints and conflicting demands. More refined distinctions are required. One of them is the distinction between perfective and preservative freedom of conscience, which reflects the two ways in which freedom of conscience is exercised: by pursuing apparent goods and avoiding apparent evils. 88 V.7.04 It is generally agreed that the state may limit the exercise of perfective freedom of conscience if it is objectively harmful, or if the limitation serves the common good. Although there may be disagreement about how to apply these principles, and restrictions Protection of Conscience Project www.consciencelaws.org 13 may go too far, no polity could long exist without restrictions of some sort on human acts, so some limitation of perfective freedom of conscience is not unexpected.
V.7.05 If the state can legitimately limit perfective freedom of conscience by preventing people from doing what they believe to be good, it does not follow that it is equally free to suppress preservative freedom of conscience by forcing them to do what they believe to be wrong. There is a significant difference between preventing someone from doing the good that he wishes to do and forcing him to do the evil that he abhors.
V.7.06 We have noted the danger inherent in the notion of a "duty to do what is wrong." Here we add that, as a general rule, it is fundamentally unjust and offensive to suppress preservative freedom of conscience by forcing people to support, facilitate or participate in what they perceive to be wrongful acts; the more serious the wrongdoing, the graver the injustice and offence. It is a policy fundamentally opposed to civic friendship, which grounds and sustains political community and provides the strongest motive for justice. It is inconsistent with the best traditions and aspirations of liberal democracy, since it instills attitudes more suited to totalitarian regimes than to the demands of responsible freedom.
V.7.07 This does not mean that no limit can ever be placed on preservative freedom of conscience. It does mean, however, that even the strict approach taken to limiting other fundamental rights and freedoms is not sufficiently refined to be safely applied to limit freedom of conscience in its preservative form. Like the use of potentially deadly force, if the restriction of preservative freedom of conscience can be justified at all, it will only be as a last resort and only in the most exceptional circumstances. The grouping might be understood as implying that beliefs, values, and cultural and religious practices are all more or less the same sort of thing. They are not, although they may be closely related and even intertwined. The focus of POHRC is belief: more specifically, moral or religious beliefs that motivate conduct. Nonetheless, the encouragement of an attitude of respect and deference encompassing a broader range of human goods is welcome.
VI. Review of Physicians and the Human Rights Code (POHRC)
VI.1.03 Respect for religious belief or freedom of religion must include more than respect for "religious practices," the term used in the text. While religious belief is expressed in specifically religious practices, like fasting during Ramadan or praying, it is also frequently expressed by adherence to a religiously informed moral code. Moreover, in a number of religious traditions, conduct motivated by religious belief is considered of equal or greater significance than religious practices.
• POHRC should avoid language that could be taken to mean that "freedom of religion"
Protection of Conscience Project www.consciencelaws.org 14 means only "freedom of worship" or the freedom to indulge in specifically religious practices.
• POHRC should explicitly affirm that freedom of conscience and religion includes the freedom to act upon moral or religious convictions.
VI.1.04 The opening sentence under the heading "moral or religious beliefs" states:
"If physicians have moral or religious beliefs which affect or may affect the provision of medical services, the College advises physicians to proceed cautiously . . ." (emphasis added) 90 VI.1.05 The reason for this advice is given later. Physicians who "restrict medical services offered" or "end physician-patient relationships" for reasons "based on physicians' moral or religious beliefs" may be prosecuted by the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) for violations of the Human Rights Code.
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VI.1.06 The first sentence of this section implies that it is unusual for physicians to be influenced by moral or religious beliefs in providing medical services: that, as a rule, the practice of medicine is a morally neutral enterprise. This is not only untrue; it is impossible. Every decision with respect to the provision of medical services and every decision to end a physician-patient relationship engages moral or religious beliefs, if only implicitly (V.1, V.3, V.4). To provide or refer for abortion, contraception or euthanasia involves moral judgement, just as refusing to do so involves moral judgement. The assertion that one decision is morally neutral and the other is morally charged is an example of "bad faith authoritarianism." (V.5) VI.1.07 The warning that physicians should proceed cautiously if their decisions are influenced by moral or religious beliefs, while understandable in view of the aggressive tendencies of the OHRC, suggests that the exercise moral judgement by physicians is barely tolerable, when, in fact, it is an inescapable aspect of human life, including the practice of medicine (V.1, V.3, V.4).
VI.1.08 POHRC is specifically concerned with restricting or refusing to provide or facilitate services primarily for reasons of conscience or religion. Such decisions are always motivated by a desire to avoid complicity in wrongdoing. The implication of the warning to "proceed cautiously" and reference to the threat posed by the OHRC implies that refusal to do what one believes to be wrong needs to be defended, and may even be indefensible. This is a perversion of fundamental moral and ethical principles. (V.6)
• POHRC should avoid language that suggests that medical decision-making is morally neutral.
• POHRC should avoid language that implies that only religious believers bring their beliefs to bear in medical decision-making.
• POHRC should avoid language that suggests that people may be obliged to do what they believe to be wrong.
• POHRC should convey the message that the practice of medicine always entails the exercise of moral or ethical judgement, which may or may not be informed by religious belief. • In adjudicating allegations of professional misconduct, the College should confine itself to matters within its competence, leaving the investigation of alleged violations of the Human Rights Code to the OHRC.
VI.2 Ontario
• POHRC should be revised to reflect this change. Nonetheless, it might warn physicians that an allegation of professional misconduct might lead to an investigation by the OHRC.
VI.2.07 "No hierarchy of rights": According to Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights Code,
"there is no hierarchy of rights in the Charter; freedom of religion and conscience, and equality rights are of equal importance." 96 VI.2.08 In the relevant passage in the judgement cited to support the statement, the Court addressed arguments that "religions whose beliefs preclude the recognition of same-sex marriage could find themselves required to participate in such marriages, or be discriminated against because of their beliefs." The Court, however, did not think the concern was valid, because "there is no hierarchical list of rights in the Charter, and freedom of religion and conscience must live together with s. 15 equality rights."
One cannot trump the other. . . the equality rights of same-sex couples do not displace the rights of religious groups to refuse to solemnize same-sex marriages which do not accord with their religious beliefs. Similarly, the rights of religious groups to freely practise their religion cannot oust the rights of same-sex couples seeking equality, by insisting on maintaining the barriers in the way of that equality. 97 VI.2.09 The Court was considering an argument in the form of a hypothetical scenario: religious believers confronted by an equality rights claim made in order to force them to provide a service they believed to be wrong. That is, the equality rights claim was in conflict with preservative freedom of conscience or religion (V.7), although the distinction was not recognized. The scenario is analogous to that of a physician confronted by the OHRC asserting that equality rights trump freedom of conscience.
VI.2.10
The Court held that, in the scenario presented, the consequence was a draw. Note, in particular, that the court did not see the refusal of the religious believers as a "barrier." The "barriers" in question were marriage laws, which the plaintiffs were challenging. By analogy, the refusal of a physician to do what he believes to be wrong should not be construed as a "barrier"; "barriers," if they exist, are things of another kind: the unavailability of alternative methods of access, for example.
• POHRC should make clear that the College does not construe a refusal to provide or participate in a procedure or service for reasons of conscience as a "barrier" or "obstacle" to services;
• POHRC should make clear that, since there is no judicially recognized rational ordering of fundamental rights and freedoms, the College will not use rights claims to suppress them, but will try to resolve the conflict by accommodation. VI.2.14 The word "genuine" does not appear in the judgement cited to support this statement, 100 and it is not clear what purpose the word serves in POHRC. Unfortunately, it could be understood to convey an attitude prejudiced against or suspicious of religious belief, and could inadvertently encourage anti-religious sentiment exemplified by the crusade against the Ottawa physicians.
VI.2.11 No 'interference': Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights Code
VI.2.15 Whatever significance one attaches to "genuine," it is erroneous to apply this statement only to religious beliefs, and could leave the impression of an intention to privilege nonreligious beliefs and discriminate against religious beliefs. Such an impression would be inconsistent with the view of the Supreme Court of Canada in Chamberlain (V.4) and would tend to foster prejudice against religious believers.
VI.2.16
The substantive meaning of POHRC's assertion turns in the first place, upon the validity of the rights claims asserted. In Quebec, for example, the Act Respecting End of Life Care (ARELC) claims that a patient has a right to euthanasia. Quite apart from constitutional issues, like many of the rights claims made with respect to demands made upon physicians, this claim is disputed on moral and ethical grounds.
VI.2.17
The question in the present context is whether or not a physician's refusal to participate in what he believes to be wrong constitutes "interference" with a patient's "rights." However, leaving aside the validity of the rights claim and Barbeau (VI.2.09), the demand by a patient that a physician do what he believes to be wrong can also be characterized as "interference" with the physician's "rights." It can even be said to have a "detrimental impact" (a consideration in the judgement) on the delivery of health care, since it can hardly be maintained that medical ethics will be vastly improved if the only physicians permitted to practice are those willing to do what they believe to be wrong.
VI.2.18
More important, to characterize a refusal to do what one believes to be wrong as an "interference" with the rights of another would necessarily imply the incoherent conclusion that physicians have an ethical duty to do what they believe to be wrong (V.6).
• POHRC should make clear that the College does not consider a refusal to provide or participate in a procedure or service for reasons of conscience to constitute "interference" with the rights of others.
VI.2.19 Limits to freedom: According to Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights
Code, "the right to freedom of religion is not unlimited; it is subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, morals or the fundamental rights or freedoms of others." 18 VI.2.20 This statement, taken from a well-known ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada, is offered by POHRC as a principle supporting the limitation of religious freedom. In the cited case, the Court struck down the Lord's Day Act because its "acknowledged purpose" was "the compulsion of religious observance" and employed "a form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter," thus offending its guarantee of freedom of religion and conscience. 102 VI.2.21 The part of the judgement from which the wording of POHRC is drawn deserves to be quoted at somewhat greater length:
A free society is one which aims at equality with respect to the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms, and I say this without any reliance upon s. 15 of the Charter. Freedom must surely be founded in respect for the inherent dignity and the inviolable rights of the human person. . . .
. . . .One of the major purposes of the Charter is to protect, within reason, from compulsion or restraint. Coercion includes not only such blatant forms of compulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of control which determine or limit alternative courses of conduct available to others. Freedom in a broad sense embraces both the absence of coercion and constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices. Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience. 103 
VI.2.22
In other words, the case quoted by POHRC to justify the limitation of religious freedom was actually about the importance of religious freedom and the need to protect religious minorities "from the threat of 'the tyranny of the majority'" -arguably represented, in this case, by the Facebook crusade against the three Ottawa physicians.
VI.2.23 Moreover, in referring to circumstances that would justify the limitation of freedoms, the Court was speaking in general terms, making no distinction between the exercise of perfective and preservative freedom of conscience (V.7).
VI.2.24
The preceding discussion indicates that the exercise of preservative freedom of conscience cannot be construed as a threat to the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. The case cited by POHRC indicates that, if the College intends to force a physician "to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or conscience" by compelling him to do what he believes to be wrong, the onus is on the College to demonstrate that the refusal of a physician to do what he believes to be wrong is unsafe, disorderly, unhealthy, or immoral.
• POHRC should make clear that the College will not force a physician to participate in procedures or services to which he objects for reasons of conscience unless it can demonstrate that his refusal is unsafe, disorderly, unhealthy, or immoral.
VI.2.25 Context: Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights
Code states that "balancing of rights must be done in context," and that "courts will consider how directly the act in question interferes with a core religious belief." Further:
[c]ourts will seek to determine whether the act interferes with the religious belief in a 'manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial.' The more indirect the impact on a religious belief, the more likely courts are to find that the freedom of religion should be limited. 105 VI.2.26 Contrary to the impression created by POHRC, neither of the cases cited to support these statements refers to -let alone distinguishes between -direct and indirect impacts on religious belief. Neither of the cases cited uses the term "core" religious belief. Five judges found that infringement of rights had occurred and that it was not trivial or insubstantial; three ruled there was no infringement, except with respect to one of the appellants, which they found to be legitimate; one held that an infringement had occurred but was justifiable in view of the rights of others. The differing views of the judges and a ruling by the bare majority demonstrates the unpredictable nature of "rights-balancing" exercises that depend, ultimately, on an adjudicator's subjective views about the relative importance of religious belief and other social concerns.
VI.2.27 In
VI.2.30
As Syndicat Northcrest demonstrates, the introduction of the terms "trivial" and "insubstantial" is meaningless in the absence of any ordering principle or standard by which something can be judged to be trivial or insubstantial, so the terminology does not shed any additional light on the problem of balancing conflicting rights and freedoms.
VI.2.31 However, the reasoning leading to the distinction between preservative and perfective freedom of conscience is helpful because it provides a rational basis for the assertion that a violation of preservative freedom of conscience or religion -such as forcing a physician to do what he believes to be wrong -is never trivial or insubstantial (V.7)
• POHRC should avoid language that suggests that the College or other state institutions can decide what constitutes a "core" religious belief. VI.3.03 However, inflexible notification protocols do not serve the interests of either patients or physicians. For example: it would probably be unnecessary for a physician who accepts a 55 year old single woman as a patient to begin their professional relationship by disclosing objections to abortion, and it could well be unsettling for the patient if her medical history includes abortion. And, while it is possible that the woman might, six months after being accepted as a patient, ask for an embryo transplant, it does not follow that the mere possibility of such a request imposes a duty on the physician to disclose moral objections to artificial reproduction at their first consultation.
VI.3.04 Interests of patients and physicians are better served by open and continuing communication. On the part of the physician, this involves a special responsibility to be attentive to the spoken and unspoken language of the patient, and to respond in a caring and truthful manner.
• If the College believes POHRC should provide more detail about the expectation of disclosure, it might add that a physician should disclose his position when it would be apparent to a reasonable and prudent physician that a conflict is likely to arise concerning treatments or services he declines to provide. In many cases -but not allthis may, indeed, be when a patient is accepted. The same holds true for notification of patients when a physician's views change significantly. VI.3.07 The difficulty here is to balance the desire of a physician to avoid complicity in a wrongful act with the importance of informed decision-making by the patient, which requires that the patient have all of the information relevant for the purpose of choosing a course of treatment. It is necessary to respect both the freedom of conscience of the physician and the freedom and right of the patient to make a fully informed choice.
VI.3.05 Providing information: Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights
VI.3.08 One satisfactory compromise would see the physician explain all legal options, including those he finds morally objectionable, and disclose the fact and reasons for his objections. In this way, the patient obtains the information he requires to make a fully informed choice, but the physician has not compromised his own integrity by appearing to recommend a procedure that he considers morally objectionable. In such circumstances it is important for the physician to convey his position in a manner that does not provoke justifiable concern about "preaching" or attempting to "convert" the patient to his opinion.
VI.3.09 Note that the legalization of euthanasia and assisted suicide may make it difficult to maintain this compromise. Many physicians who object to euthanasia and assisted suicide for reasons of conscience believe that even to suggest the possibility of euthanasia or suicide to a vulnerable patient is abusive and harmful, particularly if the suggestion comes from a physician or other people in positions of authority or intimacy.
VI.3.10 Treating with respect:
The expectation that a physician treat patients with respect includes the caution that physicians must "not express personal judgements about the beliefs, lifestyle, identity or characteristics of a patient." 114 VI.3.11 This could be understood to preclude even discussion about smoking, the need for a change of diet or an increase in exercise. Health and lifestyle are usually related.
VI.3.12 As amply illustrated by the crusade against the Ottawa physicians, physicians who comply with the requirement to disclose treatments or procedures they will not provide because of moral or religious beliefs may be accused of being "judgemental."
• The expectation should be clarified to ensure that it does not inadvertently restrict physician-patient communication about health issues.
• The expectation should be clarified to ensure that a physician will not be considered to have passed a personal judgement on a patient simply because he has complied with ethical guidelines that require him to disclose views that may influence his recommendations for treatment.
VI.3.13 Physicians who comply with the ethical requirement to disclose moral or religious views that may influence medical decision making may sometimes have to provide further information about their reasoning to make themselves understood and to avoid giving offence to a patient. Unfortunately, this can be misconstrued as a form of preaching or Protection of Conscience Project www.consciencelaws.org 22 evangelization.
• POHCR should make clear that physicians will not be considered to be promoting their own religious beliefs or seeking to convert patients simply because they have complied with ethical guidelines that require him to disclose views that may influence his recommendations for treatment.
VI.3.14 Help to find a physician: Physicians who refuse to provide some treatments or services for reasons of conscience or religion will not normally have any difficulty in meeting the first three expectations of the College, but the fourth expectation ends on a potentially problematic note. Physicians and the Ontario Human Rights Code states:
Advise patients or individuals who wish to become patients that they can see another physician with whom they can discuss their situation and in some circumstances, help the patient or individual to make arrangements to do so. The expectation of the College is that an objecting physician will help a patient "in some circumstances" to arrange to see another physician. Under what circumstances would this not, in Dr. Bernardin's words, nullify freedom of conscience? Briefly, when the physician is satisfied that the assistance he renders does not make him complicit in wrongdoing.
• The expectation that objecting physicians will, in some circumstances, help patients to find another physician should be clarified by adding that the expectation must not be understood to imply that the physicians have a duty to facilitate what they believe to be wrong. VI. 3 .29 It appears that the error is still not apparent to the GMC because euthanasia is illegal in the United Kingdom, and prosecutorial guidance precludes physician assisted suicide. 131 Hence, unlike the Collège des Médecins du Québec, the GMC has not yet had to consider how unwilling physicians might respond if ordered to find someone to kill their patients.
• If POHRC is revised, it should not follow GMC guidance with respect to referral or facilitation.
• VII.1.01 The College should avoid language or statements that could be taken to mean that "freedom of religion" means only "freedom of worship" or the freedom to indulge in specifically religious practices. It should explicitly affirm that freedom of conscience and religion includes the freedom to act upon beliefs, whether they are religious or nonreligious.
VII.2
Acknowledge the practice of medicine entails reference to moral beliefs, whether or not they are religious.
VII.2.01
The College should avoid language or statements that suggest that medical decisionmaking is morally neutral, or that imply that only religious believers bring their beliefs to bear in medical decision-making. It should convey the message that the practice of medicine always entails the exercise of moral or ethical judgement, which may or may not be informed by religious belief. It should affirm that physicians cannot be asked "check their beliefs at the door" when practising medicine because that is not merely unjust, but impossible.
VII.3
Accommodate rather than restrict or suppress freedom of conscience and religion.
VII.3.01
The College should acknowledge that forcing physicians to do what they believe to be wrong is never a trivial or insubstantial matter. It should not consider forcing physicians to participate in procedures or services to which they object for reasons of conscience unless it can demonstrate that their refusal is unsafe, disorderly, unhealthy, or immoral, and that other remedies are unavailable.
VII.4
Leave enforcement of the Human Rights Code to the OHRC.
VII.4.01
In adjudicating allegations of professional misconduct, the College should confine itself to matters within its competence. It should not attempt to rule upon what constitutes a valid religious belief or a "core" religious belief, and it should leave the investigation of alleged violations of the Human Rights Code to the OHRC.
VII.4.02 Since there is no judicially recognized rational ordering of fundamental rights and freedoms, the College should not use patient rights claims to suppress the rights and freedoms of physicians, but should resolve conflicts between patients and physicians by accommodating both.
VII.4.03 The College should not construe a refusal to provide or participate in a procedure or service for reasons of conscience as a "barrier" or "obstacle" to services, nor a refusal to provide or participate in a procedure or service for reasons of conscience to constitute "interference" with the rights of others.
VII.8.
Clarify the expectations concerning communication with and respect for patients.
VII.8.01
The expectation that a physician will not express personal judgements about patient lifestyles or characteristics should be clarified to ensure
• that it does not inadvertently restrict physician-patient communication about health issues; and
• that a physician will not be considered to have passed a personal judgement on a patient simply because he has complied with ethical guidelines that require him to disclose views that may influence his recommendations for treatment;
• that physicians will not be considered to be promoting their own religious beliefs or seeking to convert patients simply because they have complied with ethical guidelines that require him to disclose views that may influence his recommendations for treatment.
VII.9
Avoid rigid communication and notification protocols.
VII.9.01 Interests of patients and physicians are better served by open and continuing communication than rigid rules concerning notification and disclosure. Physicians should notify patients of procedures or services they decline to offer or recommend for reasons of conscience or religion when it is reasonably apparent that a conflict is likely to arise in relation to them. In many cases -but not all -this may, indeed, be when a patient is accepted. The same holds true for notification of patients when a physician's views change significantly.
VII.10 An obligation to assist a patient does not entail an obligation to do what one believes to be wrong.
VII.10.01
Objecting physicians may assist patients seeking the services they will not provide in various ways, but they have no duty to facilitate what they believe to be wrong. 12b. Tell the patient they have a right to discuss their condition and the options for treatment (including the option that you object to) with another practitioner who does not hold the same objection as you and can advise them about the treatment or procedure you object to.
VII.11 Do not follow the example of creeping authoritarianism found in the GMC
12c. Make sure that the patient has enough information to arrange to see another doctor who does not hold the same objection as you.
22. . . . if the patient cannot readily make their own arrangements to see another doctor you must ensure that arrangements are made, without delay, for another doctor to take over their care. You must not obstruct patients from accessing services or leave them with nowhere to turn. . .
If it'
s not practical for a patient to arrange to see another doctor, you must make sure that arrangements are made-without delay -for another suitably qualified colleague to advise, treat or refer the patient. You must bear in mind the patient's vulnerability and act promptly to make sure they are not denied appropriate treatment or services. . .
